This paper analyzes a supplier's incentives to foreclose downstream entry when entrants have stronger positions in di¤erent market segments, thus bringing added value as well as competition. We …rst consider the case where wholesale contracts take the form of linear tari¤s, and characterize the conditions under which the competition-intensifying e¤ect dominates, thereby leading to foreclosure. We then show that foreclosure can still occur with non-linear tari¤s, even coupled with additional provisions such as resale price maintenance.
Introduction
Many industries have seen the emergence of new distribution channels, such as mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs) in the telecommunication industry, or platforms such as Amazon.com or Alibaba.com in online retailing. These new channels often appeal to di¤erent types of customers than existing channels. For example, MVNOs typically offer cheaper "no-frills"services, targeting price-sensitive or younger customers. Similarly, online platforms attract a broad audience whereas established brick-and-mortar stores appeal more to consumers with high brand loyalty. A challenge for these entrants, however, is to get access to established suppliers. For example, MVNOs do not possess their own networks and therefore need to secure access to incumbent mobile network operators (MNOs). Similarly, online platforms must convince consumer good manufacturers to distribute their products through their channels. 1 When deciding on whether to grant access to their products, or denying supply and foreclosing the market, the incumbents face a trade-o¤. Entrants bring value by attracting di¤erent types of consumers. In theory, the incumbents may bene…t from this added value through appropriate wholesale arrangements. In practice, however, it may be di¢ cult to limit entry to speci…c segments and, more generally, to control entrants' marketing strategies; they may then compete with the incumbents, thereby dissipating pro…t, and may even end-up challenging incumbents'core business.
In this paper, we develop a simple framework to study this trade-o¤. Speci…cally, we consider a setting with one incumbent at both upstream and downstream levels, and two market segments. The downstream incumbent has a strong position in the highend segment, and faces an entrant that brings value in the low-end segment. We …rst characterize the drivers of the incumbents' decision to accommodate entry or foreclose the market when contractual arrangements with the entrant are limited to simple linear wholesale tari¤s. We then show that general non-linear tari¤s -even coupled with additional vertical restraints such as resale price maintenance (RPM) -do not always su¢ ce to maximize industry pro…t or ensure entry accommodation. This is because, as long as wholesale contracts cannot condition on the customer group to which the entrant is allowed to sell, the entrant prefers to divert units from the low-end to the high-end segment whenever the margins are larger there. As a result, foreclosure may occur.
The existing literature has considered the incentive of incumbent suppliers to dampen downstream competition by raising rivals'costs in various circumstances. Ordover et al. (1990) , Chen (2001) , and Sappington (2005) study the situation with a single incumbent and demonstrate that if the stand-alone …rm has an outside option or sells a di¤erentiated good, foreclosure is only partial. Ordover and Sha¤er (2007), Hoe-er and Schmidt (2008) , and Bourreau at al. (2011) allow for multiple suppliers and demonstrate that partial foreclosure can also occur with competition in the upstream market. These papers focus on linear wholesale tari¤s and therefore cannot answer the question why an incumbent still prefers foreclosure if more elaborate contracts are feasible. The literature on non-linear wholesale tari¤s (e.g., Hart and Tirole, 1990 , O'Brien and Sha¤er, 1992) demonstrates that if the entrant o¤ers a di¤erentiated good, full exclusion is never optimal because the non-linear tari¤ allows the supplier to extract the higher industry pro…ts in a better way. 2 In contrast, we …nd that when …rms can target speci…c market segments, non-linear tari¤s, even augmented with RPM, are not enough to guarantee entry. 3 
The Model
Initially, there are two incumbent …rms, U and D. U costlessly supplies an input to D, who transforms it into a …nal good using a one-to-one technology. There is a unit mass of consumers, with heterogeneous values and cost of service: a proportion x of consumers have valuations V D and unit costs C, whereas the others have valuations v D and unit cost c; the …rst group of consumers constitutes the "high-end"market segment and are more valuable:
We will consider two scenarios, in which either the incumbents are vertically integrated, or they can engage in e¢ cient contracting (e.g., two-part tari¤s); all results are valid in both scenarios. Throughout the paper, "the incumbents"will refer to the integrated …rm in the former scenario, and to the upstream supplier in the latter scenario.
A new …rm E can enter the downstream market, with a comparative advantage in the low-end segment: for the sake of exposition, we suppose that it faces the same costs as D in each segment, C and c, but o¤er di¤erent values to consumers, V E and v E , satisfying:
Downstream …rms can discriminate consumers across the two segments: each …rm i = D; E sets two prices, P i in the high-end and p i in the low-end segment. 4 By contrast, we assume that the supplier cannot discriminate the terms of the contract o¤ered to E 2 See Rey and Tirole (2007) for a summary of foreclosure incentives with non-linear tari¤s. 3 Gabrielsen and Johansen (2017) demonstrate that non-linear tari¤s and RPM are not su¢ cient to maximize the industry pro…t if downstream …rms must also make investment decisions. However, they are not concerned with market foreclosure. 4 For the sake of exposition, we focus here on third-degree price discrimination (which is here equivalent to …rst-degree price discrimination, due to consumer homogeneity within a segment). However, if consumption patterns di¤er across segments (e.g., high-end consumers generate larger volumes), then our insights extend to second-degree price discrimination -i.e., when …rms cannot distinguish between consumers but can o¤er several types of contracts. See the Online Appendix for a formal analysis.
according to targeted downstream segments -that is, the tari¤ can only be based on the quantity bought by E, but cannot be made contingent on which consumers the quantity is sold to. 5 The game consists of two stages: in the …rst stage, U o¤ers a wholesale price w E to E (and a two-part tari¤ (F D ; w D ) to D, if separated), which E (and D) can either accept or reject. In the second stage, D and E compete in prices.
Absent entry, the industry maximizes its pro…t by setting
We will assume that foreclosure is more pro…table than removing D from the market, that is:
Throughout the paper, we assume that the incumbents accommodate entry whenever they are indi¤erent between foreclosing it or not.
Equilibrium
The following proposition determines under which conditions foreclosure is optimal:
The incumbents foreclose entry if and only if
Proof. The incumbents can secure m by charging w E = +1 (and (F D = m ; w D = 0), under separation). Furthermore, in order for the incumbents to obtain more pro…t than m , E must be serving the low-end segment, which requires w E v E c.
Thus, consider w E v E c and a candidate equilibrium in which E serves the low-end segment. If E supplies only the low-end segment, then the price at which D serves the high-end segment must satisfy
, as E will compete with D in the high-end segment and is willing to set P E as low as C + w E ; hence, the incumbents cannot obtain more than
5 Assigning "exclusive territories"would be a simple way of preventing competition among downstream …rms, and would thus allow the incumbents to achieve industry pro…t maximization. However, such vertical restraints are not always allowed (in Europe, for example, manufacturers are prevented from restricting brick-and-mortar retailers to open online stores as well), and they may be di¢ cult to enforce. In practice, U may be unable to identify E's customers, and even if such information was available, it may not be veri…able in courts.
If instead E supplies both segments, then the incumbents'pro…t is equal to w E . It follows that the maximal pro…t that the incumbents can obtain does not exceed:
Comparing this expression with m shows that foreclosure occurs whenever (2) holds.
We now show that, conversely, entry occurs when (2) is not met. Suppose that U sets w E = v E c, inducing E to o¤er p E = v E in the low-end segment and P E = v E c + C in the high-end segment. If v E c > V E C, then E cannot actively compete in the high-end segment (as P E > V E ) and D can thus charge P D = V D in that segment. The incumbents (with w D = V D C, under separation) 6 can then obtain the entire monopoly pro…t, equal to
Under vertical integration, the incumbents thus obtain:
that D is not willing to serve the low-end segment but is willing to serve the high-end segment at price P D , as the margin
The intuition is as follows. Accommodating entry is pro…table only if E serves the low-end segment, in which case U optimally charges w E = v E c to extract E's pro…t in that segment. If v E c V E C, then E cannot compete in the high-end segment (as w E + C exceeds V E ), and the incumbents obtain the maximal industry pro…t; hence, foreclosure does not occur in equilibrium. By contrast, if v E c < V E C, then E can compete in the high-end segment as well, which reduces the pro…t that the incumbents can achieve in that segment. Foreclosure is then optimal if this pro…t-dissipation e¤ect (measured by the left-hand side of (2)) o¤-sets the added-value brought by E in the lowend segment (measured by the right-hand side). As can be seen from (2), this is more likely when the high-end segment is large (x high), E is relatively less competitive in the low-end segment ((V E C) (v E c) large), or adds little value to D in that segment
When foreclosure occurs, mandating entry (e.g., by imposing a cap on the wholesale price w E not exceeding v E c) can only bene…t consumers, 7 and increase social welfare.
Di¤erent types of wholesale contracts
From the previous discussion, if v E c V E C, then the incumbents obtain the maximal industry pro…t. Otherwise, competition in the high-end segment prevents full industry pro…t maximization, and leads to foreclosure if (2) holds. We now analyze whether these insights carry over with more elaborate wholesale contracts.
We …rst show that the use of more general tari¤s does not necessarily restore industry pro…t maximization.
Proposition 2
If v E c < V E C, non-linear tari¤s do not allow the incumbents to achieve industry pro…t maximization.
Proof. To maximize industry pro…t, D must serve the high-end consumers at price V D and E must serve the low-end segment at price v E . However, E can then divert one unit from the low-end to the high-end segment and sell it at price (slightly below) V E , and has indeed the incentive to do so if V E C > v E c, a contradiction.
Proposition 2 shows that non-linear tari¤s alone do not su¢ ce to achieve joint pro…t-maximization. The reason is that they cannot prevent E from diverting part of its sales to the high-end segment, and E has indeed an incentive to do so whenever its margin there is larger than the margin in the low-end segment. A common way to restrict further the behavior of downstream …rms is to control consumer prices, a practice known as Resale Price Maintenance (RPM). In the spirit of the above analysis, we consider here "industry-wide" RPM, where the price restrictions cannot be made contingent on consumer segments. If both types of consumers wish to buy at the contracted price, then the e¤ectiveness of such provisions depends on the extent to which …rms have to satisfy demand. We will consider two polar scenarios: in the …rst one (no rationing), …rms cannot ration demand in any way; in the second scenario, …rms can not only ration demand, but moreover select which consumers to serve. The next proposition shows that combining RPM with non-linear tari¤s enables industry pro…t maximization for a larger range of situations, but not for all.
Proposition 3 Suppose that v E c < V E C and that non-linear contracts are allowed. We then have:
(i) If C < c and V E > v E , then RPM cannot restore industry pro…t maximization, regardless of whether …rms can ration demand.
(ii) If instead V E v E , then RPM restores industry pro…t maximization, even when …rms cannot ration demand. 8 In that case, simple linear tari¤s actually su¢ ce to achieve industry pro…t maximization.
(iii) Finally, if V E > v E but C c, then RPM restores industry pro…t maximization when …rms can select which buyers to serve.
Proof. (i)
From the proof of Proposition 2, as v E c < V E C, the incumbents cannot achieve industry pro…t maximization if they do not sign an RPM contract with E. With an industry-wide RPM provision (for E, or for both downstream …rms), D must charge P D = V D , and E must charge p E = v E in both segments. If V E > v E , consumers from the high-end segments are then willing to buy from E, and E …nds it pro…table to divert sales from the low-end to the high-end segment whenever C < c.
(ii) If V E v E , then consumers from the high-end segment are not interested in buying from E at price p E = v E . The incumbents can then obtain the industry monopoly pro…t by charging w E = v E c, together with an RPM provision requiring E to charge (iii) Finally, when V E > v E but C c, charging w E = v E c achieves industry pro…t maximization if E can select its buyers: E is then willing to accept this contract and to serve the low-end segment at price p E = v E , and is not willing to serve the high-end segment at that price; 9 furthermore, as in case (ii), D has no incentive to compete with E in the low-end segment under integration, and under separation when w D = V D C.
As should be clear from the above proof, if V E > v E and C c, then, in order to achieve pro…t maximization with industry-wide RPM, E must be able to ration demand selectively (namely, to refuse selling to high-end consumers). If instead E could simply ration demand but not choose its buyers, then under usual rationing schemes some highend consumers would end-up buying from E.
The above propositions characterize the conditions under which the incumbents can obtain the industry monopoly pro…t. When this is not the case, they may be tempted to foreclose entry. The following Proposition con…rms this possibility; for the sake of exposition, in what follows we focus on the case where …rms can selectively ration consumers:
Proposition 4 Suppose that C < c and V E > v E , that RPM is allowed, and that …rms can select which buyers to serve. Regardless of whether non-linear contracts are allowed, foreclosure then occurs if and only if
Proof. To characterize the pro…t that the incumbents can achieve by accommodating entry, we …rst provide a lower bound, and show that it cannot be improved.
Suppose that U o¤ers to supply E at wholesale price w E = v E c, together with a RPM provision requiring E to set p E = v E . Under integration, E then wins the competition for the low-end segment (as the integrated …rm's upstream margin, w E = v E c, exceeds its own downstream margin, v D c); it follows that D wins the competition for the high-end segment, at priceP D V D V E + v E : indeed, D slightly undercuts E in that segment, as the associated margin,P D C = V D V E + v E C, exceeds the integrated …rm's upstream margin, w E = v E c. 10 Under separation, U can achieve the same outcome (and appropriate all the pro…ts) by supplying D at wholesale price w D =P D C: D (resp., E) then sells the high-end (resp., low-end) market at priceP D (resp., v E ) and cannot pro…tably serve the other segment. Hence, the resulting pro…t for the incumbents is given by:^
Suppose now that there exists an alternative equilibrium in which the incumbents accommodate entry and obtain a pro…t >^ . This pro…t must be at least equal to m , otherwise the incumbents would not accommodate entry; using (1), it must therefore satisfy:
Furthermore, as the entrant cannot lose money in equilibrium, the incumbents'pro…t, , cannot exceed the maximal industry pro…t, and thus:
where P D denotes D's equilibrium price. To see this, note that v E c is an upper bound on the margin obtained in the low-end segment, and max fP D ; V E g C an upper bound on the margin obtained in the high-end segment: either D sells, or E sells at a price that cannot exceed V E . It follows from (3) and (4) that P D >P D . Next, we note that E must be serving (part of) the low-end segment: otherwise, foreclosure would be more pro…table. This, in turn, requires p E v E . High-end consumers would therefore be willing to buy from E at price p E (as p E v E and P D >P D ). Moreover, as C < c, E prefers serving the high-end segment at p E than serving low-end consumers at the same price. As it can select which buyers to serve, it follows that E must be serving the entire high-end segment, at some price P E V E , as well as (part of) the low-end segment. As the margin on the low-end segment cannot exceed v E c, the resulting industry pro…t is thus bounded by:
From (1), this pro…t is lower than m , a contradiction.
It follows that the incumbents' pro…t must be equal to^ . Comparing^ with m yields the condition in the Proposition. We conclude with a discussion of the impact of non-linear tari¤s and RPM on consumers and society. Obviously, enlarging the set of instruments available has no impact when the incumbents achieve the industry monopoly outcome with linear tari¤s, which is the case if v E c V E C. When instead v E c < V E C, allowing non-linear tari¤s and RPM can only increase the pro…t derived from accommodating entry, which enhances total welfare. The impact on consumers is more ambivalent, and depends on what happens in the benchmark situation (i.e., with linear tari¤s and no RPM):
When foreclosure occurs, consumers obtain no surplus. In that situation, enlarging the set of instruments bene…ts consumers if: (i) it induces entry; and (ii) it does not allow the incumbents to achieve the industry monopoly outcome. This is indeed the case when V E > v E , C < c, and:
In that case, allowing (non-linear tari¤s and) RPM induces the incumbent to accommodate entry, and high-end consumers bene…t from some competition (D serves them at priceP D < V D ).
When instead entry occurs, consumers obtain some surplus; in that situation, which arises when
allowing non-linear tari¤s and RPM harms consumers, by allowing the incumbents to increase the price charged in the high-end segment (namely, from
Online Appendix (Not for Publication)
In this Appendix we show how our analysis can apply to the case of second-degree price discrimination, where …rms cannot explicitly discriminate consumers (e.g., because they do not identify consumers'types, or because of a legal ban on such discrimination) but can o¤er multiple contracts, designed for di¤erent types.
To this end, we modify the baseline model by assuming that high-end consumers must get at least N > 1 units in order to obtain the utility V D or V E ; otherwise, their utility is zero. The other assumptions remain unchanged: low-end consumers only need one unit to obtain the utility v D or v E , 1 and the costs of serving high-end and low-end consumers are still C and c, respectively (note that C now denotes the total cost of supplying N units to a high-end consumer).
To discriminate consumers, each …rm i = D; E can o¤er two options: a single unit at price p i and a bundle of N units at price P i . For the sake of exposition, we will assume that low-end consumers cannot "unbundle"multi-unit options (high-end consumers may however satisfy their needs by combining several single-unit options). As a result, if N is large, namely, if
then absent entry the incumbents can still extract all the surplus from consumers (by charging V D and v D to high-end and low-end consumers, respectively) and obtain:
For the sake of exposition, we focus here on the case where the wholesale contract between U and E simply consists of a linear tari¤, and denote the wholesale price by w E . Following the same reasoning as in the proof of Proposition 1, it can be checked that, to maximize their pro…t, the incumbents must charge w E = v E c and induce E to supply low-end consumers (and only those) at price p E = v E . High-end consumers are then not tempted to buy from E (at unit price p E = v E ), as the above condition N v D V D (combined with v E > v D and V D > V E ) implies N v E > V E . However, instead of making zero pro…t in the low-end segment, E could target high-end consumers by o¤ering them N units at a price above the associated cost, equal to C + (v E c) N ; if this cost is lower than V E and larger than v E , 2 then E indeed exerts competitive pressure on D, preventing it to charge more thanP
Summing-up, if V E C > (v E c) N v E C, the maximal pro…t from accommodating entry is
Comparing this pro…t with f , foreclosure is optimal if and only if
We therefore obtain a very similar conclusion as in the baseline model: E still has an incentive to target the most pro…table segment, which limits the incumbents'ability to exploit high-end consumers; this may induce the incumbents to foreclose entry.
